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Abstract 
At the heart of the growing politicization of the EU lies a concern with how European 
integration potentially undermines forms of communal self-government linked to 
established political identities. This concern originates not from the much discussed 
democratic deficit of EU institutions but from a ‘democratic disconnect’ between 
domestic democratic institutions and processes and the decisions made at the EU level 
by national executives and EU officials. Our contention is that enhancing the role of 
national parliaments in EU decision-making offers a way to reconnect the integration 
process with the communal self-rule of the member states. We ground this argument 
in an account of the normative basis of the EU that we dub ‘republican 
intergovernmentalism’. We argue that national parliaments offer a means for what we 
term the domestication and normalization of EU policy-making within the democratic 
processes of the member states. However, these effects will only occur if mainstream 
domestic parties employ these new parliamentary powers to develop competing EU 
policies that reflect their core ideological positions and those of their voters. We 
propose the introduction of a Parliamentary Legislative Initiative as a mechanism to 
provide an incentive for them to do so. 
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1. Introduction: The Political Identity Ghost in the European Integration 
Machine 
 
The Euro crisis has reinforced the doubts of certain prominent analysts of the EU 
about whether the course of integration can be addressed adequately in either neo-
functionalist or liberal intergovernmental terms (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Scharpf 
2015; Vilpisauskas 2013). Both these approaches tend to ignore a development that 
scholars have dubbed ‘politicization’ – the increasing awareness, salience, 
polarization of and mobilization around EU affairs in domestic politics, and the 
expansion of domestic actors, such as Eurosceptic parties and National Parliaments 
(NPs), in the EU’s decision-making processes (Hutter and Kerscher 2014). This 
politicization has gone together with the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ that 
characterized the pre-Maastricht phase of European integration and a shift towards 
what Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009: 5) have called a ‘constraining 
dissensus’, typified by multiple forms of Euroscepticism. We shall argue that the 
explanatory weaknesses of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism associated 
with the increased politicization of EU affairs call for a fresh look at the role that 
National Parliaments (NPs) should and could play in the context of EU multi-level 
governance.  
As numerous commentators have noted, the Euro crisis has brought to the fore 
a tension within the integration process that has been present since Maastricht. 
Following Hooghe and Marks (2009), the fault line of this tension can be located 
between the functional and economic factors that promote European integration, on 
the one hand, and the normative, cultural and social psychological factors associated 
with political identity and the desire for national self-determination, on the other 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009: 2). Neo-functionalists hoped that the benefits of economic 
coordination at the European level would ultimately ‘spill over’ into an increasing 
acceptance of the legitimacy as well as the effectiveness of gradually shifting 
collective decision-making to supranational institutions (Haas 1958; Risse 2006). By 
contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists contended that so long as the integration 
process remained under the control of the executives of the member states, then the 
demands for national democratic legitimacy were satisfied (Moravcsik 2008). If neo-
functionalists looked forward to a point where the EU might itself gain both the 
institutional capacity and the affective allegiance required to resolve the democratic 
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deficit of EU level decision-making, liberal intergovernmentalists denied the 
existence of any such problem in the first place. 
These analyses have proved too optimistic. Since the debates around the 
Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, what had previously been described as the 
‘permissive consensus’ has come to an end. ‘Permissive consensus’ referred to the 
assumed consent of European electorates with the project of integration, which was 
driven by elites who operated mainly in camera. As the difficult passage of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the increasing electoral 
success of Eurosceptic and right-extreme political parties have made abundantly clear, 
that elite driven passive consensus no longer suffices. Indeed, the associated shift of 
legitimate decision-making ‘on a range of vital issues … from an insulated elite to 
mass politics’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 13) has sparked a legitimacy crisis. For this 
change has meant the EU has gone public, yet not all of the public likes what it sees. 
This trend has become yet more pronounced as the Euro crisis has ensured that EU 
affairs have not only had a prominent place in national debates (Closa and Maatsch 
2014; Miklin 2014; Wendler 2014; de Wilde and Zürn 2012), but also become more 
contested than had hitherto been the case (Hutter and Grande 2014). Crisis-related 
decisions, such as those to provide financial support to Greece or on measures like the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the Fiscal Compact, have prompted wide 
debate and media attention, and provoked public protest in many member states.2  
This politicization of EU affairs has gone hand in hand with declining levels of 
trust in the EU – especially in those countries worst hit by the crisis (Matthijs 2014). 
As Eurobarometer polls had long revealed, and the crisis has made ever more marked, 
identity has not followed function. The EU may have acquired more competences, (de 
Wilde and Zürn 2012) yet citizens have remained attached not just culturally but also 
politically to their member states. As a result, the growing politicization of the EU has 
served not to mobilise greater citizen participation at the EU level, where electoral 
turnout in European Parliament (EP) elections has steadily declined since 1979, 
dipping below 50% in 1999 to fall to an all time low of 42.61% in 2014. Rather, the 
politicization of the EU has manifested itself at the national level, most particularly in 
electoral defeats for governments deemed to have been too submissive towards 
contested EU level policies or in the increase of votes for Eurosceptic and anti-system 
parties. This problem cannot be attributed to a democratic deficit at the EU level 
alone. The gradual extension of the EP’s powers has neither stemmed the process of 
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electoral decline in European elections nor reduced the rise of Eurosceptic parties at 
both the domestic and the EU level. Instead, the politicization of the EU within the 
member states testifies to a democratic ‘disconnect’ between domestic democratic 
processes (Lindseth 2010: 234), within which most citizens remain primarily 
engaged, and EU decision-making by national executives and political and legal 
actors at the EU level. 
In what follows, we shall argue that NPs can play an important role in 
overcoming this growing tension between European integration and communal self-
rule by reconnecting the one to the other. They can do so by providing a means for 
what we shall call the domestication and normalization of EU policy-making. The 
possibility for their so operating arises because the politicization of EU affairs need 
not be equated with Euroscepticism and the rise of populist movements. Instead, 
politicization should be regarded and deployed as a positive and necessary feature of 
democratic politics. A number of reasons motivate this argument. First, without 
politicization in EU affairs there is a reduction of policy choice. A key feature missing 
from most domestic EU debates has been the left-right polarization of EU affairs 
among the non-Eurosceptic parties and the government and the opposition (Puntscher 
Riekmann and Wydra 2013). As a consequence, substantial policy choice gets 
reduced. However, when parties fail to offer citizens such choices they deprive them 
of political efficacy during elections because they cannot select between alternative 
government programs. Second, and relatedly, this lack of policy choices means that 
those who disagree with the governmental position go un-represented. Given 
governments tend to adopt pro-integration positions regardless; a representation 
deficit gets built into the very system of EU decision-making, prompting the 
Eurosceptical challenge (Bellamy and Kröger 2013). Third, politicization reduces the 
scope for blame shifting by politicians as a result of their exploiting the lack of clear 
lines of responsibility in the EU’s multilevel decision-making structure. The more EU 
affairs get publicly discussed the less it will be possible for governments to participate 
in EU decision-making, on the one hand, while blaming others for the results of that 
same decision-making, on the other hand. Finally, the more politicized and public the 
EU becomes, the more stable it is likely to be as practices of domesticated and 
normalized opposition overtake populist Euroscepticism as the mainstream form of 
disagreement and protest. In all these respects, politicization proves desirable not so 
much for its potential contribution to supranational demos-creation, as for its 
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beneficial effects for the democratic reconnection of the executives involved in EU 
policy-making with their domestic constituencies. As a result, the growing 
politicization of EU affairs within the member states could be moved beyond a mere 
constraining dissensus on integration into a means for obtaining the active consensus 
of the various European peoples in the shaping as well as the control of that process. 
Our contention, though, is that this result can only be achieved by reinforcing rather 
than supplanting or constraining communal self-rule and established political 
identities.  
We shall argue that the basis for this approach lies in the multilevel and 
demoi-cratic normative ordering of the EU itself (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 
2013; Nicolaïdis 2013). On this account, the legitimacy of EU level decisions rests on 
their satisfying the normative logic of a two-level game (Bellamy and Weale 2015; 
Putnam 1988, Savage and Weale 2009), whereby they must be acceptable not just to 
the contracting national executives but also to the respective demoi they claim to 
represent. From this perspective, negotiators must treat each other with mutual respect 
as representatives of their citizens; appreciating that the legitimacy of their decisions 
depends on their retaining the on-going, democratic support of all their different 
peoples. Such an approach rejects the elitism of not only neo-functionalism but also 
liberal intergovernmentalism. If the failure of a sufficient transfer of affective political 
allegiances from the national to the EU level forces the former to continue the 
dirigisme associated with the Monnet method, the latter has too often reflected the 
capacity of those business and other groups able to profit from integration to promote 
their interests with governments without addressing the concerns of those for whom 
the economic, social and cultural advantages often prove less clear cut. By contrast, 
we characterise our approach as ‘republican intergovernmentalism’ (Bellamy 2013), 
seeing the role of NPs as a way of ensuring that the decisions of governments at the 
EU level operate under the equal influence and control of their peoples, whilst 
recognising the obligation of all other member states to operate similarly. The demoi-
cratic logic of this two level game entails that European integration needs to show 
equal concern and respect for the capacity for communal self-rule of its constituent 
parts (Bellamy and Weale 2015), supporting and sustaining and where necessary 
supplementing that capacity rather than substituting for it. Yet, these requirements 
need not be regarded as constraining any further European integration or even as 
rolling it back - rather they enable its shaping by the citizens of the European states – 
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a point we underline through a proposal for a positive measure, the Parliamentary 
Legislative Initiative. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 outlines the normative basis for the 
involvement of NPs in EU decision-making within the EU’s demoi-cratic 
constitutional order, outlining ‘republican intergovernmentalism’. Section 3 explores 
how far NPs currently live up to this role as mechanisms for the domestication and 
normalization of EU policy-making, noting the picture to be mixed. Although many 
of the institutional structures for the domesticating of EU policy-making exist, 
politicians and parties lack the incentives to employ them in a normalising way. 
Section 4 suggests their performance in this regard might be improved if NPs 
possessed not only scrutiny powers but the possibility to put forward parliamentary 
legislative initiatives (PLIs). 
 
2. Democratic Legitimacy in a Multilevel Europe – Towards a Republican 
Intergovernmentalism 
Hooghe and Marks have argued that tensions are inherent to the integration process 
because ‘the functional need for human co-operation rarely coincides with the 
territorial scope of community’, so that the demand of communities ‘for self rule is 
almost always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority’ 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009: 2; Rodrik 2011). Yet, neo-functionalists could retort that in 
the long run the change in the locus of communal identification they hypothesise may 
come about. Of course, as Keynes famously remarked, ‘in the long run, we are all 
dead’ (Keynes 1923: 80), rendering the long run ‘a ‘misleading guide to our current 
affairs’ and its invocation ‘too easy, too useless a task’ when it comes to meeting the 
challenges of the present (Keynes 1923: 83). Nonetheless, Hooghe and Marks’s thesis 
might be regarded as resting on a historically contingent set of circumstances. Not 
only could the conditions that have given rise to this tension pass but also advocates 
of a federal Europe could argue they should do so, given that such sentiments are 
most ardently expressed by traditionalists and authoritarians who exploit the 
temporary plight of the current losers from the integration process. By contrast, we 
shall suggest that the continued demand for communal self-rule at the national level 
has both a more justified normative basis and one that is reconcilable with recognising 
the functional and other demands for greater coordination at the European level. 
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Moreover, NPs play a key role in this reconciliation. 
 The normative basis for this approach lies in what has been termed the demoi-
cratic character of the EU: the contention that the EU involves an ever closer union of 
peoples rather than the evolving formation of a European people or demos, and exists 
to serve their joint and several interests (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; 
Nicolaïdis 2013). On the version of this thesis adopted here (Bellamy 2013), the 
political and constitutional systems of the member states should be viewed as offering 
the democratic means whereby their citizens have been able to agree collectively on 
their mutual rights and obligations as equal participants within a shared political 
space. This argument goes back to the defence of the moral standing of states 
elaborated by Kant (Flikschuk 2010; Stilz 2009). According to this thesis, the 
integrity of the legal and political structures of each of the member states deserves 
respect as having elaborated over time their own distinctive civic cultures and 
instantiated various special obligations and an associated political identity among 
their respective peoples. However, political communities do not exist in isolation. 
They interact and develop relations of interdependence. Military threats and outright 
aggression provide the most obvious negative ways one political community may 
interfere with or dominate another. But there are also numerous other and subtler 
forms of mutual influence. For example, international trade may be of very unequal 
benefit if the superior bargaining power of one or more of the trading partners puts 
them in a position to impose terms on the others. They can also be harmed by, or 
benefit from, the negative and positive externalities of each other’s domestic policies. 
When one community has laxer environmental regulations than those of its 
neighbours, say, its neighbours may suffer from the resulting pollution and the 
competition of cheaper goods, while it may benefit from the clean air and the less 
competitively priced goods produced by their superior measures. Political 
communities may also need or wish to cooperate to control a range of activities that 
operate across their respective borders, from international finance and the operations 
of multinational corporations, to transnational terrorism. Such activities include the 
development of mutually beneficial trade relationships, such as the creation of a 
single market. The EU offers a response to these various developments and their 
growing importance in an increasingly globalised and interconnected world. On the 
demoi-cratic account, though, its purpose is not to supplant the already existing 
political systems of the member states. Rather, the EU’s rationale lies in supporting 
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their right to self-government by ensuring these political communities show each 
other equal concern and respect, and can cooperate effectively and equitably to tackle 
shared problems. It achieves this result through regulating their mutual interactions 
and organising their cooperation in ways that avoid domination – not least through 
forms of supranational governance that treat all contracting member states on equal 
terms, regardless of population size, military power or wealth, and that remain under 
their joint and equal control (Pettit 2010). 
 By contrast to both the neo-functionalist and the liberal intergovernmental 
approaches, the demoi-cratic approach links the functional argument for European 
integration to communal self-rule. Unlike neo-functionalists, demoi-crats do not 
regard the functional case for supranational institutions and regulations as invoking a 
quasi-federal teleology involving the formation of a European demos and an 
associated EU level democratic system on the model of the domestic political systems 
of the member states. Instead, the demoi-cratic approach regards supranational 
institutions as delegated authorities that are best conceived as agents of the member 
states (Lindseth 2010: 227). Yet, the normative conditions motivating this view are 
not satisfied by liberal intergovernmentalism either. A demoi-cratic approach requires 
that governments act with the active rather than the passive consent of their respective 
peoples, responding to the commonly avowed interests of all their citizens rather than 
the particular interests of certain well-organised groups. On this account, agreements 
between member states at the EU level must follow the normative logic of a two-level 
game (Putnam 1988; Bellamy and Weale 2015): they must both be equally acceptable 
to the governments that negotiate them and to the citizens that each of these 
governments represents. The legitimacy of EU level decisions, therefore, depends on 
them meeting a dual standard. These decisions must reflect the consent of each of the 
demoi to whom they apply and they must not undermine the capacity for those demoi 
to give or withdraw that consent. As such, this approach operates as a form of 
‘republican intergovernmentalism’ (Bellamy 2013), since it requires the on-going 
democratic authorisation and accountability of governments by and to their citizens, 
albeit indirectly via their elected representatives, in EU decision-making. Our claim is 
that the growing ‘constraining dissensus’ results from the integration process having 
increasingly failed to meet these criteria, as the so-called ‘executive federalism’ 
(Habermas 2012) that has characterised the management of the Euro crisis illustrates. 
Yet, there are also encouraging moves to alter the institutional structures of EU 
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decision-making so as to better satisfy these conditions and so meet the challenge of 
growing domestic dissent, not least through the new powers allotted to NPs. 
The most consistent and prominent articulation of such demoi-cratic normative 
reasoning has come from the German Federal Constitutional Court. In a series of 
judgments going back to 1974, the Court has insisted that while there are important 
functional reasons for European integration the resulting arrangements and policies 
cannot be such as would be incompatible with or undermine the right to communal 
self-government embodied in the Basic Law of the German Constitution. 
Increasingly, such arguments have been voiced more widely with the result that they 
found expression post-Lisbon in Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
which specifies that ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before 
the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government.’ In a similar vein, the revised Article 5.2 TEU now insists on ‘the 
principle of conferral’, emphasizing that ‘the Union shall act only within the limits of 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein.’ As the German Federal Constitutional Court noted in its 
Lisbon judgement (2009), this principle upholds the member states as ‘the primary 
political area of their respective polities’, with the EU only having ‘secondary 
responsibility for the tasks conferred on it.’ 
 It is no coincidence, therefore, that Lisbon also witnessed a new emphasis on 
the role of NPs, with Articles 10 and 12 of the TEU recognizing them for the first 
time in the main body of the Treaty as forming an integral part of the EU decision-
making process. As Peter Lindseth (2010: 24, 234-35) has noted, from the demoi-
cratic perspective, as outlined above, the democratic legitimacy of the EU suffers less 
from a democratic deficit within the EU’s supranational institutions and more from a 
democratic disconnect between EU level policy-making and the democratic processes 
of authorization and accountability at the member state level. The past side-lining of 
NPs by executives and EU institutions, to the extent that they were designated as the 
‘losers’ of the integration process (Maurer and Wessels 2001), has played an 
important part in this disconnect. Consequently, their revitalization within EU affairs 
offers a means of democratic reconnection. Once again, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has pursued this line of reasoning assiduously by noting how the 
self-determination of the German demos was intimately linked to its Parliament, in 
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this case the Bundestag, retaining meaningful influence over German involvement in 
EU policies, including economic policy post-EMU (Federal Constitutional Court 
2014a). As the Court noted in its decision on the ratification of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, the Bundestag cannot abrogate its 
responsibility to decide its own budget nor can the German government undertake an 
open-ended liability for another state’s debts (Federal Constitutional Court 2014b).  
According to the Court, NPs provide the main mechanism through which a people are 
represented and can influence policy-making, albeit indirectly through national 
elections. They serve as the arena within which a people can collectively shape its 
‘economic, cultural and social living conditions’ according to their civic traditions 
and values. In the Court’s view, NPs cannot abrogate that function – indeed, they 
have a duty to defend it (Federal Constitutional Court 2009). 
Two roles emerge for NPs from this analysis. On the one hand, as 
acknowledged in part in their function as guardians of subsidiarity, NPs have a duty to 
ensure the EU only undertakes measures that lie within the competences member 
states have conferred upon it and that could not be achieved as effectively by action at 
the member state level. On the other hand, they need to ensure that the EU policies 
agreed and promoted by national governments and carried forward by various 
supranational actors respond to the democratic will of the various demoi and are 
capable of retaining their on-going support.  
In developing these two roles, NPs can close the democratic disconnect by 
domesticating and normalising EU policy-making. They domesticate it by taming it 
and bringing it home. It can be tamed by NPs not only using their subsidiarity 
checking powers, such as the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), but also exercising 
more control over government ministers via EU Affairs and other Committees to 
ensure EU policies do not unduly encroach on or subvert what the German 
Constitution Court designates ‘essential areas’ of domestic ‘democratic formative 
action ‘, such as ‘citizenship, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, 
revenue and expenditure including external financing and all elements of 
encroachment that are decisive for the realisation of fundamental rights’ (Federal 
Constitutional Court 2009). In making use of these instruments they can also bring 
EU policy-making home and thereby normalize it so that debates about more or less 
integration get related to the normal domestic debates concerning the character and 
quality of particular policies in terms of the broader ideological commitments of 
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citizens, particularly their position on the left-right spectrum. 
On this account, European integration need neither come at the cost of a loss 
of communal self-rule nor be regarded as in ‘inevitable’ tension with it, so that the 
assertion of one always comes at the expense of the other. Rather, when viewed from 
a republican intergovernmentalist perspective as a derived fundamental order, the EU 
can be conceived as needing to be democratically connected to, and dependent for its 
legitimacy upon, the legal and political systems of the member states. Within this 
framework, the politicization of EU affairs can be shifted away from Euroscepticism, 
undeniable though this phenomenon has been hitherto. Through being domesticated 
and normalized by the structures and processes of party competition within NPs, 
politicization can serve to reconnect the different levels of governance in the EU both 
to each other and to the citizens of the various demoi, thereby improving the quality 
of representation in the mid and long term. By stemming from, rather than operating 
against, communal self-rule, politicisation can go beyond the constraining dissensus.  
For by being channelled within, rather than having to go outside, normal domestic 
channels, such politicization can allow a form of European integration to emerge that 
is capable of obtaining the on-going assent of the citizens of Europe’s various demoi.  
 
 
3. The Role of NPs in Domesticating and Normalizing EU Policy-Making  
This section assesses the degree to which the domestication and normalization of EU 
policy-making, as defined in the previous section, have occurred in NPs, with the 
subsequent section drawing on this assessment to present a constructive proposal for 
improvement. The analysis differentiates between the institutional structures NPs 
have developed to domesticate the EU, on the one hand, and the usage of those 
structures by individual members of parliament (MPs) and political parties in ways 
that normalize debates on the EU, on the other. Given parliamentary politics is 
ultimately party politics, particular attention needs to be given to evaluating how far 
these domestic institutional structures provide adequate incentives for the main 
political parties to debate EU policies in ways their reflect their normal ideological 
commitments and divisions. As we shall see, at present the incentives provided to 
parties by existing structures are mixed, with the result that NPs currently operate as 





NPs were long considered the ‘losers of integration’ (Maurer and Wessels 2001). 
Their role was not formally recognised within the EU Treaties, while the integration 
process allowed executives to circumvent their oversight in a growing number of 
policy areas. Proposals for improving the democratic credentials of the EU focussed 
on the steady enhancement of the powers of the EP (Rittberger 2005), thereby 
marginalising NPs yet further. Despite these difficulties, NPs have gradually learnt to 
‘fight back’ and parliamentary attention to EU affairs has clearly increased over the 
past two decades. NPs have implemented institutional reforms in reaction to the 
increased importance of the EU (Karlas 2012; Winzen 2012), and the EU has given 
them more competences in turn. As a result, NPs have developed the institutional 
capacity to domesticate EU policy-making, at least to some extent.  
The potential to tame and bring the EU home has been aided by NPs setting up 
European Affairs Committees (EACs), though important national differences remain 
as to how powerful these are (Karlas 2012; Winzen 2013). Institutional reforms have 
been particularly pronounced in member states where both parliamentary authority 
and Euroscepticism are strong (Raunio 2005; Winzen et al. 2014). Particularly 
following the Lisbon Treaty all NPs have benefitted from improved information and 
new powers that allow them to scrutinise their own executives more effectively, enter 
into dialogue with the European Commission, exercise a subsidiarity check and 
cooperate with other NPs and with the EP to inform and control EU level decision-
making. 
According to the new ‘Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments’, NPs 
now receive a wide range of documents, including Commission consultation 
documents and draft legislative acts, directly rather than via their governments, as 
under the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
They also have acquired enhanced scrutiny powers with regard to executive 
action in the EU, with many NPs adopting either the documentary or especially the 
mandating models of oversight developed by the UK and Danish Parliaments 
respectively from the 1970s onwards (Lindseth 2010: 200-225). Parliaments differ 
over whether they scrutinise EU documents or the government’s position for 
negotiations in the Council or both, and whether they offer a written statement or 
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transmit their position to governments orally, in committee. The documentary model 
involves a ‘scrutiny reserve’, whereby the government cannot undertake action at the 
supranational level until parliamentary scrutiny of the relevant proposal is complete. 
The reserve can only be overridden by Ministers offering ‘special reasons’ for doing 
so, this reason giving requirement being further reinforced by the need under the UK 
model for governments to provide an explanatory memorandum on every European 
document. The Danish mandating model has been seen as even more demanding, with 
the government being required to consult on all decisions of major importance and 
present their negotiating position for approval by the parliamentary committee. Both 
models potentially improve the ability of legislators to understand EU proposals, on 
the one hand, while making the positions of national executives more transparent, on 
the other.  
EACs and parliamentary scrutiny more generally not only support the 
domestic communication and debate of EU policy-making but also foster a capacity 
to tame it by promoting respect for communal self-rule. That occurs both by insisting 
on the need for domestic democratic authorization for EU measures and by ensuring 
the process of European integration respects the primacy of the domestic democratic 
sphere through being limited to those measures that can be most effectively and 
efficiently achieved at the supranational level. This latter element lies behind the 
growing assertion of the subsidiarity principle from the Treaty of Maastricht onwards, 
culminating in the introduction of the EWM in the Lisbon Treaty, which permits NPs 
to police subsidiarity and proportionality by way of the so-called yellow and orange 
cards (Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, Article 7). The issuing of ‘reasoned opinions’ by NPs also allows 
them to enter into political dialogue with the Commission. Following the so-called 
‘Barroso Initiative’, the Commission undertook to reply to all contributions sent to it 
by NPs, even those that did not relate to subsidiarity (Jančić 2012). Additionally, NPs 
can challenge legislative acts on grounds of their infringing subsidiarity by bringing 
an action before the Court of Justice. Moreover, they are now involved in the 
evaluation of measures taken within the area of freedom, security and justice (Articles 
70, 85, 88), while an individual NP may block Treaty changes under the simplified 
revision procedures by vetoing the so-called passerelle clause, (Article 48). They 
must also be informed of new applications to join the EU (Article 49). 
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Finally, NPs engage in inter-parliamentary cooperation. Because the EWM 
requires coordination among the 28 NPs, it promotes inter-parliamentary networking 
and the exchange of information (Cooper 2013; Sprungk 2013). COSAC (the French 
acronym for the ‘Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of 
Parliaments of the European Union’) is the most developed form of inter-
parliamentary cooperation. It is officially authorized ‘to submit any contribution’ that 
it deems appropriate to the EP, the Council and the Commission. Inter-parliamentary 
bodies have also developed in those areas where EU institutions and actors operate at 
the borders of their sphere of competences and possess a degree of executive 
discretion: namely, Financial and Monetary Policy and Common Security and 
Defence Policy (see the contribution by Cooper in this issue). Such bodies provide 
mechanisms for NPs to retain their power to scrutinize executive action in areas 
where national governments have delegated their authority to EU officials. 
In sum, we can see that although the competences of NPs – and governments – 
have been reduced in the context of European integration, they have begun to acquire 
the institutional capacities and legal capabilities to control not only their conferral to 
the EU level but also to monitor and influence their use. As a result, the structures 
exist for domesticating EU policies along the lines of the republican 
intergovernmental model outlined in the last section. However, these mechanisms will 
only operate as a means for democratically reconnecting the EU to the demoi of the 
member states to the extent they are employed by national political parties and form 
part of the normal processes of political contestation. Otherwise, the politicization of 
EU affairs at the domestic level will remain the terrain of Eurosceptical parties 
protesting against an on-going democratic disconnect. 
 
Normalization 
As we noted, politicization involves the greater salience, polarization of and 
mobilization around EU affairs. By the normalization of this phenomenon we mean 
the debate of alternative EU policies by the non-Eurosceptic political parties, 
according to their characteristic ideological commitments. Such normalized 
ideological debates would turn less on the legitimacy of the EU or its actions per se, 
matters that preoccupy the Eurosceptic parties, and more on reasonable disagreements 
concerning the particular policies that the EU puts forward or implements. In this 
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way, party competition over EU policy could become attuned to the core domestic 
policy concerns and divisions of voters.  
Hitherto the EU institutional space has done anything but encourage the active 
engagement of domestic political parties in EU affairs. The legal and political 
structures of the EU have progressively decreased the domestic political alternatives 
available to national parties in a number of ways (Bellamy and Kröger 2014). They 
have been restricted a) by way of the transfer of competences to the EU, which limits 
the available ‘policy space’ in which parties can intervene (Mair 2007); and b) by the 
prioritizing of the completion and realization of the internal market over other 
political aims, which reduces the ‘policy repertoire’ available to parties and thereby 
the opportunities for them to disagree and propose alternatives (Mair 2007). These 
restrictions impact on the degree of political contestation and debate between parties 
by constraining in their turn the area of reasonable disagreement between them: a) by 
way of the supremacy and direct effect of EU law as interpreted and upheld by the 
Court of Justice and its claims to ‘competence-competence’ in deciding whether it 
may legitimately override national constitutional objections or not; and b) by way of 
the party political composition of the main EU institutions (an institutionalized ‘grand 
coalition’) and the consensus-oriented nature of the EU’s institutional setting more 
generally, which produces legislative proposals that reflect a somewhat centrist 
compromise that tries ex ante to anticipate and integrate the interests and concerns of 
both centre-left and centre-right parties, rendering political conflict about the 
proposals difficult once they come before NPs. As a result, parliamentary attempts to 
contest or debate the integration process risk becoming unreasonable. NPs have had 
no choice but to adapt to and implement EU law. The net effect of these factors is a 
reduction in political alternatives that national governments – and thereby parliaments 
and parties – can offer to voters, which in turn decreases electoral competition, 
rendering elections less decisive (see also Nanou 2013). In turn, parties attempt to 
avoid the politicization of EU policies, given that under these conditions it is hardly 
an attractive electoral issue. 
The new parliamentary procedures described above can potentially help 
overcome these constraints by providing domestic democratic channels through which 
EU policies can be pursued. The crux is whether parties have adequate incentives to 
employ them. For parties to politicize an issue in the manner described above, four 
conditions must usually be met (Miklin 2014). First, the issue must be sufficiently 
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salient to affect the choices of the party’s voters. Second, the party’s position on the 
issue needs to be congruent with that of its voters. Third, its position needs to be 
sufficiently internally cohesive to avoid internal conflicts. Finally, the party’s 
competitors need to hold different positions that allow for polarization. Hitherto, 
these conditions have only applied to Eurosceptic parties with regard to EU affairs. 
However, the Euro crisis has undoubtedly raised the awareness of national electorates 
about the impact of EU policies on their lives. As such, it offers a good test case of 
the degree to which adequate incentives exist for other political parties to use the new 
domestic institutional structures to normalize the politicization of the EU. Although 
the published empirical evidence is still sketchy, it nonetheless allows us to offer a 
preliminary assessment with regard to each of the four conditions. 
First, the salience of EU affairs in domestic debates and elections, and even in 
EP elections, has traditionally been low (Reif and Schmitt 1980). However, crisis-
related decisions, such as those to provide financial support to Greece or measures 
like the European stability mechanism or the Fiscal Compact, have generated 
parliamentary debate (Wendler 2014; Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013; Closa 
and Maatsch 2014, and the contribution by Wonka and Göbel in this issue) and media 
attention throughout the Euro-zone, and resulted in public protest in many member 
states. Also, more governments than ever before in the history of the EU have been 
voted out of office, many clearly as a result of the austerity measures they had felt 
obliged to implement because of their undertakings as members of the Euro-zone. 
Therefore, the salience criterion has been met. 
Second, many non-Eurosceptic parties, particularly the major parties, have 
traditionally held more positive views towards the EU than their voters (Hooghe and 
Marks 2008). This lack of congruence has disinclined them from politicizing EU 
affairs. This gap appears to have widened with the crisis, both in debtor and in lender 
states, with national electorates objecting to the financial cuts or spending 
respectively to which their governments have agreed. By contrast, smaller parties at 
the extremes of the political spectrum, particularly those on the extreme-right, tend to 
enjoy a greater congruence with their voters on EU affairs and have been able to 
exploit the crisis to promote their Eurosceptical views (Green-Petersen 2012; Mattila 
and Raunio 2012).  
Third, many parties lack cohesion through being internally divided over the 
EU. Whilst broadly sympathetic to the idea of European integration, social democrats 
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can worry about the implications of the internal market and of neo-liberal policies 
stemming from the EU. They often see the domestic welfare state as endangered. By 
contrast, conservative parties often divide along traditionalist lines, as in the UK, with 
some members seeing the EU as a source of excessively liberal policies in areas such 
as free movement or anti-discrimination regulations (see Auel and Raunio 2014). We 
are aware of no literature as yet on whether the internal coherence of mainstream 
parties on EU policies has increased or decreased since the outbreak of the crisis. 
Finally, the fourth condition of polarization is the most important for 
democratic reconnection by parties. For the reasons explored above, mainstream 
parties have hitherto agreed more than they have disagreed about EU policies, 
particularly in such European integration-friendly member states as Germany (see 
Auel and Raunio 2014; and Wonka and Göbel in this issue). As a result, public 
disagreement has focused on the constitutional question of whether there should be 
more or less Europe rather than on what kind of policies the EU should pursue. Given 
their own internal divisions and their lack of congruence with their voters, in this 
context the main parties could hardly hope to gain votes by highlighting EU issues.  
Has this absence of domestic party competition around the EU changed with 
the Euro crisis? To some degree, it seems so. NPs have debated the Euro crisis, and 
ideological conflicts between the left and the right have come to the fore (Baglioni 
and Hurrelmann 2014; Closa and Maatsch 2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Maatsch 
2014; Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013; Wendler 2012; and Raunio, and Wonka 
and Göbel in this issue). Indeed, Frank Wendler contends that the plenary debates in 
the British, French and German parliaments on the Euro crisis generally adjust to the 
established logic of party politics at the domestic level (Wendler 2014a). However, it 
also seems that these ideological divides have often been side-lined by the main 
parties feeling obliged to act ‘responsibly’ and simply approve rescue measures (Mair 
2011; Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013).  
Adapting Wendler’s  (2014b: 5-6) categorisation of the framing arguments 
used in parliamentary discourse on the crisis, we can distinguish disagreements of an 
ideological kind regarding the character and advisability of a given policy, such as we 
have associated with a normalized politicization of the EU, from disputes of a 
pragmatic kind concerning the technical efficacy of EU action, and anti-systemic 
objections questioning the very legitimacy and justice of the EU, typical of 
Eurosceptic parties. The evidence Wendler presents suggests that the main parties 
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favoured a pragmatic discussion of austerity measures over a debate that reflected 
their normal ideological divisions. As a result, more radical parties of left and right 
have been able to mount anti-systemic challenges to these measures on grounds of 
their democratic legitimacy and justice. Similarly, Carlos Closa and Aleksandra 
Maatsch (2014) note this pattern in their study of parliamentary debates of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in eleven Euro states. They show party 
positions were mainly polarized between mainstream parties, be they in government 
or opposition, that adopted pragmatic arguments favouring rescue measures on 
functional economic grounds, on the one hand, and more extreme right and left wing 
parties that employed arguments of an anti-systemic nature, on the other, with right-
wing Eurosceptic parties appealing to national values and interests, and the left-wing 
parties criticizing austerity measures for a lack of solidarity and social justice typical 
of what they view as the neo-liberal structures of the EU (Closa and Maatsch 2014: 
13, 14). A similar assessment emerges from Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra’s (2013) 
study of parliamentary discussion of legislation relating to the Euro crisis between 
2010 and 2012 in Italy, Germany, and Austria. The empirical evidence presented 
shows that legislation relating to the handling of the Euro crisis was passed in NPs by 
majorities that time and again comprised both government and opposition parties. 
They also show how the main parties have sought to marginalize criticism of the 
proposed measures as unrealistic and irresponsible. This suggests opposed positions 
that might represent the interests of those citizens who could be damaged by 
particular policies get damned as somehow against the national interest. In 
consequence, contestation has been left to the largely Eurosceptic parties at the 
extremes.  
Overall, the tendency of major parties to play down the EU varies between 
member states as mediating factors intervene, such as the national narrative about the 
EU and media receptiveness to EU issues (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). In fact, EU 
issues have been most debated in NPs where consensus is greatest rather than where it 
is weakest (Auel and Tapio 2014). Germany in particular fits this pattern (see the 
contribution by Wonka and Goebel in this issue). Not only are Eurosceptic parties not 
represented in Parliament but also the responsibility to take a ‘European’ decision was 
in the German case not a matter of passively accepting a decision made by others but, 
thanks both to its role as the main ‘lender’ state and to the Federal Constitutional 
Court’s judgment, a decision the Bundestag could potentially shape via its influence 
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on the German government. As a result, its debates were perhaps the most 
ideologically contested of all (Wendler 2014b). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests 
that even though the powers of NPs have increased with the Lisbon Treaty, the 
incentives for most parties to deploy them in ways that normalize the politicization of 
the EU remain weak.  
 At this stage, not much can be said about normalization via the inter-
parliamentary mechanisms that COSAC, the EWM and other bodies provide, given 
their recent introduction. However, the prospect for normalization in these contexts 
seems bleak for several reasons. First, many of their activities are carried out by 
parliamentary bureaucrats (Högenauer and Neuhold 2014), making them an unlikely 
candidate for the normalization of EU affairs through political parties. Second, the 
fusion of the executive and the legislative in most NPs, which implies that it is the 
government that provides opinions on EU affairs, will not incentivize all parties and 
MPs to get engaged with these inter-parliamentary mechanisms and bodies. Third, the 
policing of subsidiarity under EWM involves both a high threshold and is framed in 
legalistic terms which will hardly inspire mass public debates. It is also concerned 
more with the constraining of European integration on ‘technical’ grounds than 
shaping the kind of policies the EU should have on the basis of particular ideological 
views. Finally, the EWM does not allow NPs or parties to criticize inaction by the EU 
or to promote new areas of integration, but is limited to subsidiarity and 
proportionality checks of legislative proposals. 
In sum, the four conditions supporting the normalizing of the domestic debate 
of EU affairs by non-Eurosceptic parties have only arisen under fairly favourable 
circumstances, and even then, remain weak. In addition to the first condition of the 
salience of the EU with the electorate, which is now generally present, two further 
factors appear particularly important. They relate to the second and fourth conditions 
of congruence with supporters and the possibility of party polarization. First, parties 
must not fear giving electoral advantage to smaller Eurosceptic parties on either their 
left or right. Second, they must feel capable of influencing policy in ways that reflect 
their distinctive ideological convictions, rather than simply accepting its pragmatic 
utility or questioning its legitimacy. To a degree the two are mutually supporting. 
Only if the EU policies advocated by the main parties can be aligned with their core 
ideological positions will their policies on the EU be likely to be congruent with those 
of their supporters and so be capable of being the subject of normal party competition 
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around polarized policy programmes. The next section offers a proposal aimed at 
promoting the required congruence and polarization by addressing these two factors. 
 
 
4. A Parliamentary Legislative Initiative 
As we have seen, the Euro crisis provides a propitious context for politicization to 
occur. Indeed, it has prompted debates that have involved a discursive coupling of the 
EU and the domestic levels, even though the management of the crisis was clearly 
dominated by the European Council (Dinan 2011: 119). However, it is quite possible 
that once the Euro crisis is settled political parties and NPs will go back to ‘business 
as usual’, preferring not to debate EU affairs. To avoid that happening, and to ensure 
NPs live up to their role in republican intergovernmentalism of reconnecting the 
integration process to domestic democratic politics, we believe they need to move out 
of the shadow of the legacies of both the ‘permissive consensus’ and the ‘constraining 
dissensus’. We propose that one way to achieve the more permanent coupling of the 
EU and domestic levels through NPs is through a Parliamentary Legislative Initiative 
(PLI), as a means of fostering the normalized politicization of the EU by non-
Eurosceptic parties, which we shall outline below.  
Eric Miklin has argued that polarized legislative proposals can help ‘to 
overcome parliaments’ reluctance publicly to discuss and compete on EU issues 
because such proposals change the incentive structure of those large centrist parties 
that are able to enforce parliamentary debates’ (Miklin 2014: 88). However, Miklin 
discusses the possibility of ‘top-down politicization through polarising Commission 
proposals’ (ibid.). We consider that such polarized proposals are unlikely to come 
from the Commission, given the grand-coalition-character of politics at the EU level. 
But more fundamentally, we argue in favour of bottom-up politicization through 
greater involvement of NPs, which is more likely to satisfy requirements of 
communal self-rule and identification with policies.   
By a PLI we mean the possibility for NPs to put forward legislative proposals 
in regard to issues that are of shared concern with the citizens of the demoi of other 
member states. Such legislative proposals could be either for the EU to initiate 
legislation in a new policy area, or they could propose the EU modifying or 
withdrawing from a given policy area. A similar mechanism, the so-called ‘green 
card’, has been suggested recently by both the European Committee of the British 
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House of Lords and the Dutch Parliament, and is now the subject of a consultation 
exercise by COSAC.1   
Similar to the rules of the EWM, we propose that the PLI involve cooperation 
between NPs. A PLI would be triggered by at least a 1/3 of the MPs in a minimum of   
a 1/4 of all the NPs in the EU. The total number of NPs would be calculated by 
counting each chamber in bicameral systems as 1 and weighting the NPs of 
unicameral systems as 2. In the case of the threshold being reached, the Commission 
would be obliged to put forward a legislative proposal to be considered by the normal 
legislative procedure. As we note below, we set this threshold deliberately below 
requiring a majority of MPs in 50% of all NPs in order to stimulate debate in part by 
empowering opposition parties as much as those in government. The demoi-cratic 
legitimacy of any measure would still be guaranteed by the normal legislative process 
requiring a super majority in the Council and the EP for any proposal to be enacted. 
How would a PLI work in favour of the four conditions of salience, 
congruence between parties and voters, internal cohesion and polarization so as to 
provide a positive incentive structure for political parties to normalize the domestic 
political contestation of EU affairs? We consider that it will be very unlikely that EU 
policies will return to the shadow of the permissive consensus (de Wilde and Zürn 
2012), given that the Euro crisis measures mean they now impact directly on areas 
that are electorally salient for most citizens and given the high degree of politicization 
these policies have already attracted. We also consider that it is next to impossible for 
parties to not be internally divided – to a greater or lesser degree – over any given 
policy, and particularly over EU policy. We do not address these two conditions, 
therefore. Rather, as we noted above, we focus on the impact of the PLI in favouring 
the two key factors we identified as favouring the crucial conditions of congruence 
and polarization, which as we saw are linked. 
We contend that the PLI should support the two factors lying behind both 
these conditions. These factors involved i) mainstream parties considering that the 
politicization of the EU does not advantage Eurosceptic parties, and ii) allows them to 
adopt positions that reflected their core ideological commitments. Being entitled to 
                                           
1 HoL EU Committee, 9th Report Session 2013-14, The Role of National Parliaments 
in the EU, 24 March 2014, pp. 19-20; Questionnaire for the 23rd Bi-annual Report of 
COSAC, 23 February 2015, Section 2. 
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influence EU affairs positively rather than merely in a reactive way, through 
subsidiarity checks, favours both factors. Parties need not be reduced to debating 
mere technical and pragmatic considerations of a ‘responsible’ rather than a 
‘responsive’ character, or be forced into opposing the demands for less integration on 
the anti-systemic grounds deployed by the Eurosceptic parties. Instead, they may 
seize the initiative to promote a policy measure which accords with their general 
ideology. Parties in government can push their executives towards adopting proposals 
that go beyond the compromises they may feel obliged to make as members of an EU 
level ‘grand coalition’. Such moves could aid their bargaining power by revealing a 
ground swell of domestic support for particular measures. More importantly, the 
comparatively low threshold of a 1/3 of MPs is designed to allow opposition parties 
also to promote such initiatives and thereby to put forward alternative EU policies to 
the government. That not only empowers the opposition to develop EU policies of 
their own but provides an additional incentive for government parties to also defend 
their position on ideological grounds. Meanwhile, the need to cooperate with other 
NPs under the PLI will work against parties acting purely opportunistically or 
operating in the manner of Eurosceptic parties to protect a narrowly conceived 
national self-interest.  
We observed in the last section how the ability of parties to promote policies 
that align closer to their ideological identities supports both congruence with their 
supporters and polarization between parties. To the extent the PLI fosters these 
developments by non-Eurosceptic parties, therefore, it will allow them to reconnect 
their input into EU policy-making with the domestic democratic process. In line with 
republican intergovernmentalism, they will not be tied to merely passively supporting 
commitments made by their executives at the EU level. Instead, they may shape those 
commitments and engage directly in dialogue with other NPs as well as EU level 
institutions. In so doing, they can also move the politicization of EU policy-making 
away from a constraining dissensus monopolised by Eurosceptic parties that 
challenge the legitimacy of the EU and towards a more active consensus on the kind 
of integration the citizens of the different peoples of the EU wish to see. By virtue of 
these proposals coming from different NPs, the likelihood is that they will support 
rather than subvert communal self-rule. In other words, they will either be in areas 
that add value to what member states could manage on their own, or be in areas that 
strengthen the capacity for self-rule by reducing the potential for decisions in one 
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We have disputed the thesis that the politicization of EU affairs needs to be linked to 
an inexorable tension between European integration and communal self-rule. Instead, 
re-connecting the integration process to the domestic processes of normal party 
competition can bridge that tension. We have argued that this approach has a 
normative basis in a demoi-cratic understanding of the EU that we have called 
republican intergovernmentalism. In this approach, NPs play a crucial function as 
mechanisms for what we termed the domestication and normalization of EU affairs. 
EU policies can be domesticated by being brought home and discussed in domestic 
forums and tamed so that they do not undermine the domestic democratic processes. 
However, the incentive structure for non-Eurosceptic parties to use these mechanisms 
in ways that lead to the normalization of the politicization of EU affairs along the 
normal ideological divisions that structure most domestic politics is currently largely 
lacking. In particular, the main government or opposition parties tend to acquiesce to 
almost all EU measures on pragmatic grounds, or raise mainly technical objections, 
thereby lending credence to the attempts by Eurosceptic parties to dispute their 
legitimacy. To counter this tendency, we propose the creation of a Parliamentary 
Legislative Initiative (PLI) as a way of fostering such normalized debates of EU 
affairs. We believe it promotes the two factors we identified as likely to support both 
polarization between mainstream parties and convergence with their electorate by 
stimulating them to compete on rival EU policies that reflect their core ideological 
commitments. It does so by encouraging the non-Eurosceptic parties, especially those 
in opposition, to promote a distinctive package of EU policies without fearing they 
would merely advantage Euro sceptic parties and that reflect their core ideological 
perspectives and so are more congruent with their voters and liable to promote normal 
party polarization through being distinct from those of the government. As a result, 
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